Most businesses now have some form of two-step sign-in. So if we already have multi-factor authentication (MFA), why then do we need passkeys?
To answer that we need to look at an example of how attackers get past MFA.
How the attack works
Someone in your business gets an email saying a document has been shared with them. The link opens what looks like the normal Microsoft sign-in page. They enter their email address and password. The page then asks for their code, as you would expect. They open their phone and type the six digits in.
From their point of view, nothing looked wrong.
What they don't know is that the fake page was passing everything straight through to the real Microsoft login as they typed it. The password and the code went through. By the time the page showed an error and they tried again, the attacker was already signed in as them.
Everything worked as designed. The password was strong and the code arrived on the right phone. None of it helped, because the user handed both over to a page they believed was Microsoft's.
The same thing happens over the phone with no technology at all. Someone rings claiming to be from IT, says they're fixing a problem with the account, and asks the user to read out the code that has just arrived. People do, because it's a plausible request from someone who sounds like they're helping.
The code did its job. It just did it for somebody else.
Why a passkey breaks it
A passkey is not a stronger code - there is no code at all. Nothing to type into the wrong box, and nothing to read out to a stranger.
What happens instead is a short exchange between your device and the website that proves you are you, without the secret ever leaving the device. The passkey is also registered to the real address of the real site. If you try to use it on a fake copy, it doesn't work, because the address doesn't match.
That matters more than it first appears. The protection doesn't depend on anyone spotting the fake.
Where the UK's own authority puts each method
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which is part of GCHQ, publishes a ranked list of the ways a business can confirm who is signing in.
Passkeys and security keys come first, and they're the only kind the NCSC describes as resistant to phishing. Codes sent by text come last, and it says they're only likely to be appropriate when nothing else is possible.
In between sit the authenticator apps, and this is where most businesses will find themselves. The ones where you approve a prompt come second. Better than a code, but the NCSC notes that people approve prompts they didn't trigger, especially when several arrive in a row. The ones that show a six-digit code come third, and it calls them known to be vulnerable to exactly the interception described above.
Microsoft has reached the same conclusion and is acting on it. Text-message sign-in is being retired from Microsoft 365 altogether, with the main deadline falling on 1 February 2027.
Two questions we get asked
"I'm not asking staff to put their fingerprints on their personal phones." You don't need to. Windows Hello on a company laptop is a passkey, and so is a small security key on a keyring. Neither touches anyone's personal device.
"What happens if someone loses their phone?" It depends which kind of passkey. One saved into a password manager, including the ones built into iPhones and Android phones, is backed up and appears on the person's other devices. One tied to a single laptop or a single security key is not.
That's the real argument for giving everyone two ways in rather than one.
Where to start
Find out what your people are actually using. Not how many have two-step sign-in switched on, but how many are relying on a code sent to a phone, and how many have a phone number registered as a way in at all, even alongside something stronger. An account is only as safe as the easiest way into it.
Microsoft is retiring its own text message and voice codes in February 2027. Until then, the code is the weakest part of signing in, and that attack route stays open.
